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This paper examines the determinants of degree outcomes in a sample of UK universities 
from 2004 to 2012. We use stochastic frontier methods to account for differences in 
efficiency across universities and over time. The quality of the student intake and the 
university’s research performance are the main determinants of degree outcomes. There is no 
evidence of grade inflation at the boundary between upper and lower second class honours. 
Decomposing the determinants of degree outcomes, we find that good entry grades yield a 
higher return in traditional universities than in new universities. Although high quality 
universities award more good degrees, we find little evidence that universities of different 
quality differ in their propensity to inflate grades over time. 
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“Everyone at this graduation is first in his class. What a grand and glorious 
accomplishment! The diplomas are all here and since every one of you is first in 
his class, you can simply come up and get them in any old order you please”.  
 
Lao She, Cat Country.  
 
In any sphere of activity where standards are set, assessors face the challenge of ensuring the 
constancy of the level of performance that is required to meet the given standard. In certain 
contexts this is a straightforward task, but in others, where objective measurements are 
difficult or when the context within which the evaluation is taking place is changing, 
assessment to a consistent standard is more difficult. In such circumstances, incentives may 
be present that serve to discourage assessors from being consistent, and the outcome will 
result from a tension between these incentives and forces working in the opposite direction; 
this is notably the case where success in meeting the standard might be used as a performance 
indicator to which reward is attached. In the field of monetary policy, for example, such 
conditions might lead to price inflation. In the field of education, which is the focus of the 
present paper, they might lead to grade inflation. 
 
Grade inflation has been a perennial source of concern for policy makers. In the United 
Kingdom, the Higher Education Academy has recently launched its ‘Transforming 
Assessment in Higher Education’ pilot scheme (http://bit.ly/X06tLP) amidst substantial press 
coverage.3 This project aims to refine the process of student assessment, thereby 
compensating for the fact, noted in several studies, that the ability of the current system of 
degree classification to distinguish between students’ performance has declined (Universities 
UK, 2007, 2012; Higher Education Academy, 2012). This has led the GPA advisory group to 
call for a national review of degree classifications after a five year period of trialling 
alternative mechanisms (Grove, 2015). But equally in other countries, the tendency for grade 
                                                          
3 The Sunday Times (22 September 2013) refers to the scheme as an attempt to introduce more refined grade 
point averages (GPAs) alongside the traditional British degree classification – though it also reports that grade 
inflation is a concern in countries that use GPAs. More recently, Universities Minister Jo Johnson has 
announced a Teaching Excellence Framework that will include ‘incentives for the sector to tackle degree 
inflation and ensure that hard-won qualifications hold their value’. He also proposes to provide ‘extra 
granularity through a grade point average’ (http://bit.ly/1gaGPjt). 
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inflation to occur has been noted. In the US, Stuart Rojstaczer has written about this tendency 
in the Washington Post (28 January 2003), and has subsequently recorded the phenomenon 
on his website www.gradeinflation.com. He finds that, since the 1980s, average GPA scores 
across US colleges has risen from below 2.9 to 3.1. In related work, Rojstaczer and Healy 
(2010) detail how this increase in average scores varies across types of institution.  
 
If the increase in grades serves to compress more and more students into a smaller number of 
grade classifications, then clearly the process of grade inflation entails a loss of information 
to users – which may include graduate schools and employers. This, in turn, can result in a 
deterioration in the quality of employer-employee matches, thereby harming economic 
efficiency. While grade inflation concerns a nominal variable, it can therefore have real 
costs.4 
 
Yet it is far from clear that the increases in assessment scores that are observed in practice are 
indeed the result of grade inflation. A number of other factors may be at work, and it is 
desirable that we should, as far as possible, seek to separate these out. For example, 
technological advances and improvements in quality assurance procedures may have led to 
pedagogical improvements in universities that enable them to add more value to their 
students than was previously the case. Likewise, similar improvements in primary and 
secondary education may mean that universities can build on students that enter higher 
education with stronger foundations of knowledge and understanding. Moreover, changes in 
the efficiency with which students sort themselves across universities may further contribute 
to rising performance over time. Our goal in this paper is to shed as much light as possible on 
the factors that underpin the apparent improvements in students’ performance over time, and 
hence to establish the extent to which this is attributable to grade inflation. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a brief 
review of the relevant literature. This is followed by a consideration of our methodological 
approach and the data sources used in the empirical analysis. We then report the results of 
this analysis, and conclude with a restatement of our findings and some suggestions for future 
research.  
 
                                                          
4 Johnson (2003), Pressman (2007) and Babcock (2010) all suggest that a further real cost of grade inflation is 
that students tend to work less hard, and learn less, when good grades are relatively easy to come by. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Marks (2002) argues that norms are public goods. These norms include those that attach to 
the evaluation of work that students submit for assessment – they apply across whole cohorts 
of students and are thus non-rival and non-excludable. In common with other public goods, 
there are incentives for consumers to free ride. In the context of norms, people are generally 
happy for others to subscribe to standards, but if adherence is costly they are happy to seek 
ways of circumventing them themselves. Higher education institutions aspiring to be classed 
among the elite may wish to set high standards in order to enhance their prestige, but at the 
same time yield to the temptation to manipulate metrics by which they are judged. 
 
McKenzie and Tullock (1981) provide an interesting rationale for this in their analysis of how 
tuition fees in the US rose during the rapid post-Sputnik expansion of higher education. 
Institutions that subsequently found difficulty in recruiting sufficient students were unable to 
reduce tuition fees since their costs had risen in line with their revenues; they had therefore to 
find a different way of pricing themselves into the market, and increasingly lenient grading 
practices may have been used to achieve this. Freeman (1999) has tested this idea by 
examining the relationship between grading standards and labour market prospects in 
different disciplines. His findings support the hypothesis that grading is more lenient in 
disciplines where the price of higher education needs to be relatively low in order to 
compensate for a weak labour market for graduates. Other studies that report that average 
grades have been rising at different rates in different subject areas include Sabot and 
Wakeman-Linn (1991), Anglin and Meng (2000), and Jewell et al. (2013). The first of these 
is particularly interesting since it provides evidence for a ‘demand curve’ where the strictness 
of grading practice is regarded as a price.  
 
The tension between the public good nature of norms and the incentive to cheat on those 
norms has led several authors to view grade inflation in a game theoretic context. Such 
studies include those by Correa (2001) and Johnes (2004). The latter considers a simple 
model in which there are two students, each of whose utility is determined by their rank order 
in grading. So the 𝑖𝑖th student enjoys utility of 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖, where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 denotes the 𝑖𝑖th 
student’s grade.  Suppose that 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 depends on some absolute measure of the value of 𝑖𝑖’s work, 
𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖, but that it is also influenced by pressure that the students bring to bear on the assessor, so 
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that 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖, where 0 < 𝜎𝜎 < 1. Here the 𝛿𝛿 terms are binary variables 
reflecting student-specific pressure, and students each choose the value of this variable to 
maximise their utility. It is readily seen that the Nash equilibrium is one in which each 
student sets this equal to one, thus creating pressure for grade inflation.  
 
Chan et al. (2007) have developed the idea of grade inflation as a game further, by 
considering the schools to be the players. Schools signal the quality of their graduates to 
employers using the grades that they award. This signal is made up in part of a component 
that reflects students’ abilities but in part also of a component that is due to schools wanting 
to help their own students in the face of competition from other schools. Employers know 
this, but they do not know how much weight is assigned to each component. It is therefore in 
schools’ interest to inflate grades.  
 
In the same spirit, work by Achen and Thurnau (2009) investigates pressures that university 
departments face vis-à-vis each other. Where modules form part of the compulsory core of a 
degree programme, they expect to find relatively low grades; where, on the other hand, the 
modules are optional, and thus need to compete with other modules for student registrations, 
they expect grading to be more lenient. Where assessment relies on subjective judgements, 
grading is expected to be more lenient, because assessors seek thereby to avoid the costs 
imposed by students who try to query low grades.  Finally, departments that are struggling to 
recruit students are likely to offer more lenient grading. Some support for each of these 
hypotheses is found using data from the University of Michigan.  
 
The last of Achen and Thurnau’s hypotheses might, by extension, be viewed as implying that 
more prestigious universities are, given their strong position in the market, less likely than 
others to succumb to the temptations of grade inflation. Yet Popov and Bernhardt (2013) 
argue otherwise. They develop a model in which good universities respond to a rising 
demand for highly skilled workers by relaxing the conditions under which they award top 
grades; they do this because they are seeking to optimise employment outcomes for their 
graduates, and they can exploit the fact that employers are not able to distinguish between 
relatively strong and weak students within the top grade. In support of their theory, Popov 





Several developments in the technology of educational production may have served to 
improve performance. For example, Bracey (1994) suggests that the introduction of word-
processing software allowed students to improve the presentation of their work. Innovations 
of this kind are sporadic and one-shot, however, and do not do much to account for a 
consistent trend over a prolonged period. Nevertheless, technology more generally might 
evolve gradually in such a way that it contributes to increasing achievement over time, and 
this raises the question of how best to capture such effects in empirical analyses. 
 
Efforts to evaluate the extent of grade inflation in the US include contributions by Kolevzon 
(1981) and Compton and Metheny (2000). Both claim to find evidence that grade inflation is 
indeed present. In the UK there has been some evidence of grade inflation at secondary 
school level. Exercises that have presented cohorts of students, years apart, with identical 
problems suggest that while some of the apparent gain in performance is genuine, some has 
also been illusory (Tymms and Fitz-Gibbon, 2001).   
 
Evidence of grade inflation at the level of higher education has been harder to come by, 
however. Johnes and McNabb (2002) and Johnes (2004) adopt an educational production 
function approach, using stochastic frontier analysis to model a measure of the university 
average of students’ grades, using a panel of universities as the data set. The explanatory 
variables include average student scholastic achievement on entry to university and a variety 
of other indicators of student demographics. Changes in these variables are likely to account 
in part for changes, over time, in university average grades. Likewise, changes in the 
efficiency with which universities convert inputs to outputs, measured by the non-normal 
component of the residual in the stochastic frontier estimator, likely accounts for some of the 
change in grades over time. The model specification also includes a full set of time dummies, 
and the authors argue that changes in the coefficients on these dummies reflect grade inflation 
– since they cannot be due to changes in input quality or in efficiency. The results suggest 
that there was some grade inflation over a short period during the mid-1980s, but not in the 
1990s. 
 
The empirical work reported in the remainder of this paper updates and builds on the Johnes 
and McNabb approach. In particular, it allows us to investigate whether there has been any 
further grade inflation in the UK higher education system since the early part of the last 
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decade. In addition, we are able to perform a comparison between the conflicting findings of 
Achen and Thurnau (2009) and Popov and Bernhardt (2013) on the relationship between 
university quality and grade inflation.   
 
3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data used in the empirical analysis that follows come from the Sunday Times University 
Guide, published annually in September each year. For each higher education institution in 
the UK they provide information on a variety of variables. These variables include the 
student-staff ratio, library expenditure, expenditure on other facilities, and research 
performance (as measured by the Research Assessment Exercise). The data set also contains 
information about the average performance of students in each institution both on entry 
(measured by the mean tariff score achieved in the upper secondary school exit qualifications, 
typically A levels) and on exit (measured by the proportion of students graduating with first 
or upper second class honours degrees; henceforth, good degrees). All monetary values have 
been converted into real terms using the consumer price index with base year in 2005. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Table 1, which shows, among other 
things, that there is substantial variation in the variables used in the analysis, both over time 
(comparing the 2004 to 2008 sample and the 2009 to 2012 sample), and across universities 
(comparing the pre-92 universities to the post-92 universities). Figure 1 shows a clear rising 
trend in the percentage of good degrees in our sample at all points of the distribution (with 
the possible exception of the upper tail).  
 
[Table 1 here] 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
We shall be interested in establishing the relationship between university output – as 
measured by the proportion of students graduating with good degrees – and input. In order to 
ensure that the appropriate input variables are used, we study output in a given year as a 
function of, inter alia, the quality of students recruited three years earlier, reflecting the 
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duration of a typical bachelors programme in the UK.5 Our data span the period from the 
2003-04 academic year to the 2011-12 academic year.  
 
We follow the lead of Johnes and McNabb (2002) and Johnes (2004) in modelling the 
production of good degrees in a stochastic frontier framework. This allows us to evaluate the 
effects of (i) changing inputs, including changes in the quality of the student intake over time, 
(ii) changing efficiency in the conversion of inputs to outputs, reflecting genuine changes in 
productivity in the higher education sector, and (iii) through the use of time dummies, grade 
inflation. By using time dummies to capture grade inflation, we are defining grade inflation to 
be any change in grades that is not explained by changes in the inputs or efficiency6.  
 
The inputs used in the production function are those discussed above: entry grades, student-
staff ratio, library expenditure, expenditure on other facilities, and research performance. We 
believe these are important inputs in the production of university degrees; Smith and Naylor 
(2001) and Wossmann (2003) have used similar types of variables in analysing the 
determinants of undergraduate performance in the UK (Smith and Naylor) and international 
student performance in science and mathematics (Wossmann)7. Similarly, de Paola and 
Scoppa (2011) show for an Italian public university that larger class sizes have a negative 
effect on student performance. Our focus is therefore on university characteristics as inputs 
rather than student characteristics, although some recent evidence (Nicoletti and Rabe, 2013) 
has shown that family characteristics play an important role in school outcomes8. 
 
                                                          
5 There are exceptions. Medicine and architecture, for example, are longer cycle degrees. Some students also 
undertake industrial placements or spend time studying abroad, both of which have the effect of lengthening 
their period of study. But, reflecting the fact that there is already a considerable measure of subject 
specialisation at upper secondary school in England and Wales, three years study for the bachelors degree 
remains the norm. 
6 Given the level of aggregation in our data we are unable to identify the reason for grade inflation, whether it is 
more lenient marking, technological change that allows different forms of assessment that enable higher marks, 
or some other reason. Identifying the reason for grade inflation is clearly an important issue for future research.  
7 Data are also available on the outcomes from the National Student Survey (NSS), which is a measure of 
student satisfaction with degree provision. This survey started in 2005, so restricts our sample to the 2005-2012 
period. Including the proportion of students expressing satisfaction on the overall measure of the NSS as an 
explanatory variable yields similar results to those reported. However, it may be questioned whether the NSS 
score is an input into the degree production process, or an output. We therefore do not include the NSS score in 
the reported results.  
8 The Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI) has conducted a survey of student experiences in UK higher 
education beginning in 2006. The survey includes information on students’ self-reported private study time, 
which may be used as an additional input in the production function. However, data availability is limited for 
the time period we consider.  
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Stochastic frontier models were introduced into the literature by Aigner et al. (1977), and 
have been widely used in the economics of education as a means of evaluating cost functions 
(see, for example, Izadi et al., 2002; Johnes and Johnes, 2009). The stochastic frontier 
approach is based on the idea that no university can outperform the production frontier; as a 
result, barring noise, all observations lie within the frontier. To implement this, the error term 
in the regression model is divided into two components: the classical error term, and a one-
sided term which represents inefficiency. Therefore, the stochastic frontier approach is 
different to conventional regression methods, in which the best-fit line passes through the 
centre of the data, and does not allow universities to differ in terms of their efficiency9. With 
the benefit of a panel data set, a variety of models become available for analysis (Greene, 
2005). The results reported below are obtained using a true random effects specification in 
which 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + β'X𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (1) 
 
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁[0,𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2] and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = |𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖| where 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁[0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2].     (2) 
 
The dependent variable, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is the logged proportion of degrees awarded at first or upper 
second class honours level, and 𝐗𝐗𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 denotes the vector of logged explanatory variables; in 
each case the 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 subscripts represent university and year. The 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are time dummies; an 
increase in the value of coefficients of these dummies as 𝑡𝑡 rises would reflect a measure of 
grade inflation. This specification of the model allows efficiency to be measured by the 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
term, but allows institution-specific variation that is due to unobserved heterogeneity other 
than efficiency differentials to be captured by the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. This represents an advance over the 
previous literature, which is unable to separate efficiency differences from other forms of 
heterogeneity across institutions (Greene, 2005).  
 
The 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 may be estimated with either fixed effects or random effects used to capture variation 
across universities. Although the true fixed effects model is desirable in that it allows for 
university-specific effects to differ across universities, we have made use of the true random 
effects model because the true fixed effects model suffers from an identification problem. 
                                                          
9 The specifications used in our main table of results (Table 2) are re-run using conventional random effects 
methods to compare the results. These results are reported in the Appendix, and show that the two different 
estimation methods yield similar results.  
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That is, the signal-to-noise ratio (𝜆𝜆 =  𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢/𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈) in the true fixed effects model is very large, so 
that the log-likelihood becomes quite flat, leading to numerical maximisation problems (see 
Belotti et al 2013). As a result, the parameter estimates from the true fixed effects model are 
not very stable. In addition, Greene (2005) shows that the predicted efficiency scores from 
the true fixed effects and true random effects models are very similar to each other.  
 
The half-normal specification of the efficiency term represents a choice on the part of the 
analyst; 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 must be non-normal in order to distinguish it from 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, but a range of possibilities 
exists, including gamma, exponential and truncated normal. In our experience the choice 
makes little difference to results, and since half-normal is fairly standard in the literature we 
choose this option10. It is worth noting that the assumption that efficiency follows a 
distribution that is non-normal is just that – an assumption. In the present analysis, we would 
expect this assumption to be satisfied as a consequence of the fierce competition that exists 
between institutions of higher education in the UK; this competition should lead most 
institutions to be relatively efficient in converting their inputs into good degree results, with a 
small number of less efficient outliers.  
 
It is possible to restrict the one-sided error term to be constant across all time periods for each 
institution such that 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. We choose not to impose this restriction, and so we allow 
flexibility in the model to accommodate changes in efficiency over time for each institution. 
The 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are recovered using the method of Jondrow et al. (1982) and, given the log 
specification of the model, may be expressed as efficiency scores using the transformation exp(−𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖).  
 
Once the coefficients of the preferred equation are estimated, we conduct a three way 
Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition of the gap between groups in the proportion of good 
degrees awarded at the frontier, 𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦2 − (𝑢𝑢1 − 𝑢𝑢2), where the subscripts are group 
indicators. Following Daymont and Andrisani (1984) and Jann (2008), the gap in outcomes 
between groups may be expressed as a three way decomposition  
 (𝑋𝑋1 − 𝑋𝑋2)𝛽𝛽2 + (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2)𝑋𝑋2 + (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2)(𝑋𝑋1 − 𝑋𝑋2)     (3) 
                                                          
10 We have also performed the analysis assuming an exponential distribution for the efficiency term. The results 
are similar to those reported in Table 2 using the half-normal distribution, and are available from the authors 




where the calculation is performed at mean values of the explanatory variables. The first term 
shows the endowment effect: the part of the gap that can be explained by differences in 
characteristics between groups. The second term shows the coefficients effect: the part of the 
gap that can be explained by differences in the returns to endowments between groups. The 
third term shows the interaction effect: the part of the gap that can be explained by 
observations in group 1 having a higher return on those characteristics for which they have 
higher means. Where an explanatory variable is a dummy, we normalise the effects relative to 
the grand mean to make the decomposition invariant to the choice of omitted category (see 
Yun 2005, Jann 2008). In the analysis section that follows, we provide three way 
decompositions in order to evaluate the source of the gap in the propensity to award good 
degrees, first between time periods, and secondly between different types of universities.  
 
We make use of the three way decomposition instead of the more common two way 
decomposition because the two way decomposition is most often used in the discrimination 
literature, where the gap between groups is decomposed into an explained component and an 
unexplained component, the latter of which is usually attributed to discrimination. Whilst not 
uninformative, we believe that the three way decomposition we perform in this paper 





4.1 Main results 
 
Estimated coefficients for the model are reported in Table 2. The simplest specification 
includes as explanatory variables only the average entry grades of students (three years 
before their cohort graduates) and the time dummies. The coefficient on entry grades is 
positive but not statistically significant. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
intuitively plausible. An average intake which has three A levels each of grade A has a tariff 
score that (at midpoint) is 18% higher than an intake which has three A levels each of grade 
B, so the coefficient of 0.15 implies that a university with the former intake profile will 
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graduate around 1.6 percent more of its students with good degrees (0.18 × 0.15 × 0.6097 =0.01646).  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Few of the time dummies are significant. From 2008 onwards, however, there is a rising trend 
in the coefficients, and these become significantly different from zero in 2011 and 2012, 
suggesting some grade inflation. Indeed, by 2012, the proportion of good degrees awarded 
has risen by over 3.7 percentage points11, other things being equal. While we cannot infer 
causality, it is interesting to note that this has coincided with a period of intensifying 
competition in the higher education sector in England, with undergraduate tuition fees rising 
from around £1000 per year to £3000 from the 2006 entry cohort, and later up to £9000 from 
the 2012 entry cohort.  
 
In the remaining columns of the table, we add further explanatory variables. In the second 
column, it is readily observed that research score affects the dependent variable significantly 
and in an intuitively plausible direction. However, the student-staff ratio, library spending 
and facilities spending do not have statistically significant effects on the percentage of good 
degrees. Entry grades are now significantly and positively related to the percentage of good 
degrees, with a slightly larger coefficient than in column 1. The time dummies are again for 
most part statistically insignificant. The coefficients are negative in the earlier part of the 
sample, becoming positive in 2011 and 2012 (albeit not significantly so), reflecting the 
pattern observed in column 1 of the table. What this suggests is that, because the other 
explanatory variables are themselves increasing over time, controlling for this increase 
eliminates the grade inflation result from column 1.  
 
In column (3) of Table 2, we add a set of interaction terms between entry grades and the time 
dummies. Our intention here is to test the hypothesis that entry grades have become more 
important over time as a determinant of degree outcomes. This might be the case if sorting of 
students into degree programmes improves over time, strengthening peer effects and hence 
reinforcing the positive impact of higher education in institutions that recruit high quality 
intakes. The increased competitiveness of higher education in England, noted earlier, may 
                                                          
11 This is equal to the coefficient for 2012 multiplied by the sample mean: 0.061 × 60.97% = 3.72%.  
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well have contributed to prospective students becoming more selective in their choices of 
where and what to study, in the sense of choosing courses and universities which are more 
appropriate to their abilities and interests.12  
 
The coefficients on the interaction terms are mostly significantly positive, especially for the 
years between 2008 and 2011. The size of the coefficient increases over time; entry grades 
are becoming a stronger and more significant predictor of degree class. This indicates that 
there is evidence for improved sorting. At the same time the coefficients on the time dummies 
become significantly negative. This suggests that, after controlling for the improved sorting 
over time, there is no evidence of grade inflation, or indeed, that there is some evidence of 
grade deflation. Entry grades and research scores remain significantly and positively related 
to the percentage of good degrees.  
 
Finally, the last column of Table 2 shows the results of the model with all explanatory 
variables but no time dummies. These results are shown since the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition between time periods which we perform next does not allow for the inclusion 
of time dummies. The results excluding the time dummies are broadly comparable to those in 
column (2) which include them.  
 
Figure 2 plots the distribution of efficiency scores over time, omitting the outliers to highlight 
the main features. Median efficiency is high in all years (approximately 0.93), and shows no 
obvious trend. There may be some evidence that the distribution became more compressed 
between 2008 and 2010; however this was reversed in 2011 and 2012.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
 
                                                          
12 Future research may take note of a change in university admissions procedures in 2009 that provides a neat 
discontinuity and which may have affected the quality of matching between students and institutions. In that 
year, the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service, which coordinates applications to undergraduate study 
at British higher education institutions, introduced a system known as ‘adjustment’, which allows students to 
switch their choice of university after they get their A level results; this option is likely to be pursued by 
students who perform better than expected, and may lead to an improvement in sorting that was not possible in 
earlier years. Adjustment may have influenced the results observed in the present paper – the interaction term 
becomes significant only in the years after its introduction – but it has taken several years for this option to 
become widely appreciated and exercised. As recently as 2011, only a few hundred students exercised the 
option, but the numbers have risen rapidly since.   
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4.2 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
 
In Table 3, we report the results of a variety of three way decompositions. In the first column, 
we focus on the gap between the degree results variable in the years from 2004 to 2008 and in 
the years from 2009 to 201213. The gap amounts to 3 percent in favour of the later period. 
Differences in endowments (especially research and entry grades) more than explain the total 
gap, while the later period in fact has worse returns to endowments than the earlier period, 
although this is due to a much lower constant term in the later period. The positive interaction 
between endowments and coefficients indicates that where the later period has a higher 
return, it is in variables in which the later period is better-endowed, and is significant for 
entry grades, library spend, and research score.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
In the remaining columns of Table 3 we provide decompositions for various specifications of 
the model, focusing this time on the gap between pre-1992 universities and other 
institutions.14 Column (2) reports results without time dummies, column (3) adds the time 
dummies, and column (4) includes both time dummies and time-entry grade interactions.  In 
1992 a large number of higher education institutions were given university status for the first 
time. These were mainly polytechnics whose mission was focused on teaching, and they 
contrast sharply with institutions that had university status before 1992 in that the latter have 
missions that emphasise both teaching and research. While the distinction between pre-1992 
and post-1992 institutions has blurred at the edges in the decades since this change, the two 
mission groups serving research intensive institutions (the Russell Group and the 1994 
Group) both comprise only pre-1992 universities; the distinction between pre- and post-1992 
institutions therefore remains relevant.  
 
Before moving on to the discussion of the decomposition of the difference in outcomes 
between pre-92 and post-92 universities, we briefly refer back to Table 1. This reports 
descriptive statistics of the two time periods under consideration (2004 to 2008, and 2009 to 
                                                          
13 Recall that this is measured on the frontier, so that we are studying a decomposition of 𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦2 − (𝑢𝑢1 − 𝑢𝑢2).  
14 Note that the analysis of the gap between time periods in column 1 of Table 3 is, by necessity, conducted 
using a specification of the frontier model without time dummies. For the analysis of the gap between different 
types of university, the time dummies can be included; hence results from three different specifications of the 
model are reported in the remaining columns. 
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2012), and for the two groups of universities (pre-92 and post-92 universities). It can be seen 
that all values are higher for the later period than for the earlier period apart from the student-
staff ratio which was unchanged. Similarly, pre-92 universities outperform post-92 
universities in all the measures, although the differences are larger in some variables than in 
others. Figure 3 shows the percentage of good degrees over time by pre-92 and post-92 
universities, showing that in both cases there is a rising percentage of good degrees over time. 
Figure 4 shows the efficiency scores of the two groups of universities; pre-92 universities are 
on average slightly more efficient than post-92 universities, and exhibit smaller variance both 
across institutions and over time.   
 
[Figure 3 here] 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
In column (2) of Table 3 the gap in the proportion of good degrees awarded between the two 
groups of institutions is pronounced, at nearly 24 percent in favour of pre-92 universities. 
This is roughly equally divided between the endowments, coefficients, and interaction 
effects. Among the university characteristics, it is differences in entry grades and research 
quality which have the largest and most significant effects on the difference in good degrees. 
However, the really big difference between pre-92 and post-92 universities is in the return to 
university characteristics. There is a much higher return to entry scores in pre-92 universities, 
and a much smaller constant term. This is also reflected in the interaction terms: pre-92 
universities have higher returns to characteristics in which they are well-endowed (such as 
entry grades). This suggests that students with good A level scores should attend pre-1992 
universities because their talent is rewarded more highly there. This observation is clearly 
related to the sorting mechanism alluded to earlier. 
 
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, the inclusion of the time dummies and interaction terms 
results in the interaction between endowments and coefficients playing the predominant role 
in explaining the gap between pre- and post-92 universities. Differences in endowments play 
almost no role in these specifications. We once again see a large effect of differences in the 
coefficient on entry scores, as well as on research scores, with pre-92 universities benefitting 
from higher payoff to both these characteristics than post-92 universities. This comes through 
in the interaction terms as well: for the characteristics that pre-92 universities excel in (entry 
grades and research scores), the return to the pre-92 universities is higher than to the post-92 
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universities. The conclusion is once again that good students do better in pre-92 universities 
than in post-92 universities.  
 
4.3 Additional results 
 
We next extend the basic model to analyse the conflicting findings of Achen and Thurnau 
(2009) and Popov and Bernhardt (2013). To recap, Achen and Thurnau find that a stronger 
market position would lead to less pressure for grade inflation, whereas Popov and Bernhardt 
argue that it is the better universities that would lower standards to give their students more 
favourable job market outcomes. We make use of two alternative measures of university 
quality: an indicator for whether the university is a pre-92 or a post-92 university, and an 
indicator for whether the university is a member of the Russell Group15 of leading 
universities. These indicators are interacted with the year dummies, and the coefficients of 
the interaction terms will shed light on whether it is higher-quality institutions that suffer 
more grade inflation over time, or vice versa.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 reports these results; column (1) for the post-92 indicator, and column (2) for the 
Russell Group indicator; including both indicators in the same regression yields similar 
results. Controlling for all the other determinants of degree outcomes, post-92 universities 
award fewer good degrees than pre-92 universities. The magnitude of this coefficient is large; 
a post-92 university would typically award 15.4 percent fewer good degrees than a pre-92 
university with identical characteristics. This is an important indicator that post-92 
universities award fewer good degrees than pre-92 universities beyond the fact that they have 
fewer inputs into the production of good degrees (see Table 1). There is some suggestion that 
post-92 universities are more susceptible to grade inflation than pre-92 universities since the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are increasing over time; however, they are statistically 
significant only in the earlier part of the sample period, where the coefficients are negative. 
This suggests that, controlling for university characteristics, post-92 universities had a 
                                                          
15 “The Russell Group represents 24 leading UK universities which are committed to maintaining the very best 
research, an outstanding teaching and learning experience and unrivalled links with business and the public 
sector” (The Russell Group, 2013).  
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tendency to award fewer good degrees than pre-92 universities between 2004 and 2008; 
however, this tendency has to some extent been reversed in more recent years.  
 
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the same exercise for Russell Group universities. The Russell 
Group indicator is positive and significant; Russell Group universities award more good 
degrees than other universities, even after controlling for other inputs into the production of 
good degrees. A member of the Russell Group would typically award 12.2 percent more good 
degrees than a non-member with the same characteristics. However, the interactions between 
the Russell Group indicator and the year dummies are not statistically significant; neither do 
they show any clear trend.  
 
Care must be taken in interpreting the significant coefficients on the post-92 and Russell 
Group indicators in Table 4. It may indeed reflect differences in the strictness of grading, but 
it may also reflect compositional differences in the subjects offered by different types of 
universities; it may simply be that Russell Group universities have more students in subjects 
which award a larger proportion of good degrees16. Our dataset does not allow us to 
investigate which of these possible explanations is the more valid, but this is an important 
issue for future research.  
 
All the foregoing analysis has made use of the percentage of good degrees (first class and 
upper second class) as our dependent variable. However, as discussed in the Introduction, as 
the percentage of good degrees has increased, it may cease to be a discriminating measure of 
good performance. Hence we replicate the specifications in the first three columns of Table 2 
using the (natural log of) percentage of first class degrees as the dependent variable. Data for 
this extension were obtained from the HESA (Higher Education Statistics Agency) Students 
in Higher Education Institutions database. On average, in our sample, 13.5 percent of degrees 
awarded are first class degrees, and the correlation between the percentage of first class 
degrees and the percentage of good degrees is 0.76. Figure 5 shows that the percentage of 
first class degrees has also been rising over time.  
 
[Figure 5 here] 
[Table 5 here] 
                                                          
16 This is a more general point; compositional differences in terms of subject mix occur across all universities, 




The results are reported in Table 5. Column (1) shows that, when we control only for entry 
grades, there is strong evidence of grade inflation; the coefficients on the year dummies are 
increasing over time, and highly significant. When we control for other determinants of 
degree outcomes in column (2), evidence of grade inflation still exists, but is somewhat 
weaker; the coefficients on the year dummies are smaller than in column (1), albeit still 
highly significant. In column (3), when we include interactions between entry grades and the 
year dummies to allow for greater sorting of students by ability, there is little evidence of 
grade inflation, or of increased sorting. Of the other explanatory variables, entry grades, 
library spend and research scores are all positively and significantly related to the percentage 
of first class degrees awarded. Overall, our results using data on the determinants of first 




Grade inflation grabs headlines. It provides empirical illustration of Goodhart’s law – where a 
measure is used as a performance indicator, it becomes subject to manipulation (Goodhart, 
1981). It is also a highly emotive subject – educated people are loath to see their 
qualifications devalued by subsequent relaxation of standards. However, ascertaining the 
extent to which grade inflation occurs is far from straightforward.  
 
In this paper we have investigated the issue of whether grade inflation has occurred in higher 
education in the UK in recent years, using a stochastic frontier approach to take into account 
different levels of efficiency across universities. The evidence to support the existence of 
grade inflation is, at best, patchy. The quality of the student intake to universities has 
typically been rising over this period, and there have been changes in other factors that might 
reasonably be supposed to affect degree performance too. Moreover, the efficiency with 
which higher education institutions convert their inputs into outputs has remained fairly 
constant over time. The intensification of competition in the higher education sector appears 
to have resulted in an increase in the efficiency of the matching process between students and 
universities, and there is evidence that this too may have led to an improvement in 
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outcomes17. However, whilst better universities award more good degrees, we find little 
evidence that different groups of universities exhibit different degrees of grade inflation over 
time. To the extent that there has been grade inflation over the period covered by our study, 
this seems to be evident mainly at the boundary between upper second class and first class 
degrees. 
 
All our results control for entry grades achieved by secondary school leavers – whether those 
are the result of A-levels or other qualifications. This has an important implication. What we 
show is that universities do not contribute to grade inflation over and above any grade 
inflation that might affect these entry grades. Clearly, investigating the presence of grade 
inflation in secondary schools is an important issue for future research.  
 
The emotive nature of the content suggests that ours is unlikely to be the last word on the 
subject. This is good, not least because changes in the way university admissions are 
organised mean that there will in future be the opportunity for more rigorous consideration of 
some of the issues. In particular, as noted earlier, the introduction of adjustment offers the 
possibility of a discontinuity that could, with a few more years of data, be instructive. 
  
                                                          
17 However, Dillon and Smith (2015) find little evidence of gains resulting from re-sorting students amongst 
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Panel A: Full Sample (N = 968) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.     
% good degrees 60.97 10.854    
Entry grades 292.3 76.78    
Student-staff ratio 17.50 3.50    
Library spend 747.7 316.1    
Facilities spend 263.9 114.5    
Research score 48.54 22.12    
 
Panel B: Two time periods (2004-2008), and (2009-2012) 
 2004-2008 (N = 518)  2009-2012 (N = 450) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.  
% good degrees 59.41 10.73  62.76 10.73 
Entry grades 278.8 72.43  307.87 78.76 
Student-staff ratio 17.57 3.68  17.41 3.280 
Library spend 659.6 272.1  849.1 332.6 
Facilities spend 226.3 94.03  307.1 120.5 
Research score 41.13 26.66  57.08 9.941 
 
Panel C: Pre-92 and Post-92 universities 
 Pre-92 universities (N = 509)  Post-92 universities (N = 459) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.  
% good degrees 68.08 9.045  53.08 6.282 
Entry grades 346.16 63.72  232.6 33.89 
Student-staff ratio 15.45 2.930  19.76 2.554 
Library spend 862.5 359.2  620.3 192.1 
Facilities spend 294.8 108.6  229.6 111.0 
Research score 64.11 11.34  31.29 17.96 
Notes: Entry grades are based on the UCAS points system in which an English pre-university qualification with 
three or four subjects is awarded 120 points for an A, 100 points for a B, 80 points for a C, 60 points for a D, 
and 40 points for an E. Library and facilities spend have been converted into real terms using the Consumer 
Price Index with base year in 2005. The research score is obtained from the Research Assessment Exercise and 





RESULTS OF THE TRUE RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL. 
Dep var: ln(% good degree) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Entry grades) 0.148 0.186 0.108 0.228 
 (0.121) (0.027)*** (0.051)** (0.063)*** 
Ln(Student-staff ratio)  -0.041 -0.056 -0.043 
  (0.099) (0.031)* (0.029) 
Ln(library spend)  0.038 0.038 0.029 
  (0.051) (0.017)** (0.016)* 
Ln(facilities spend)  0.002 0.001 0.007 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
Ln(research score)  0.023 0.050 0.034 
  (0.009)*** (0.022)** (0.008)*** 
2005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.240  
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.132)*  
2006 -0.012 -0.014 -0.270  
 (0.007)* (0.008)* (0.184)  
2007 -0.013 -0.027 -0.414  
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.215)*  
2008 -0.010 -0.026 -0.458  
 (0.015) (0.016)* (0.223)**  
2009 0.009 -0.022 -0.881  
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.338)***  
2010 0.019 -0.016 -0.913  
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.380)**  
2011 0.036 0.004 -0.795  
 (0.018)** (0.019) (0.355)**  
2012 0.061 0.027 -0.472  
 (0.018)*** (0.021) (0.359)  
Entry grades*2005   0.043  
   (0.023)*  
Entry grades*2006   0.046  
   (0.032)  
Entry grades*2007   0.070  
   (0.038)*  
Entry grades*2008   0.078  
   (0.039)**  
Entry grades*2009   0.150  
   (0.058)***  
Entry grades*2010   0.156  
   (0.065)**  
Entry grades*2011   0.139  
   (0.061)**  
Entry grades*2012   0.087  
   (0.062)  
N 968 968 968 968 
Universities 116 116 116 116 
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢  0.0880 0.0847 0.0841 0.0767 
 (0.0079)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0092)*** 
𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈  0.0188 0.0226 0.0238 0.0349 
 (0.0085)** (0.0063)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0060)*** 
𝜆𝜆  4.676 3.754 3.529 2.194 
 (0.0151)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0143)*** 
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Estimation 
method is Greene’s (2005) True Random Effects model with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in 




THREE WAY BLINDER-OAXACA DECOMPOSITION OF THE RESULTS. 
  (1) 
Group 1 = after 
2008 
(2) 
Group 1 = Pre-
92 
(3) 
Group 1 = Pre-
92 
(4) 
Group 1 = Pre-
92 
overall Group 1 4.165 4.254 4.252 4.270 
  (0.014)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** 
 Group 2 4.133 4.016 4.059 4.047 
  (0.012)*** (0.024)*** (0.018)*** (0.025)*** 
 difference 0.032 0.238 0.192 0.223 
  (0.018)* (0.025)*** (0.019)*** (0.027)*** 
 endowments 0.085 0.082 -0.022 -0.006 
  (0.010)*** (0.020)*** (0.031) (0.041) 
 coefficients -0.159 0.058 -0.010 -0.017 
  (0.031)*** (0.034)* (0.028) (0.042) 
 interaction 0.106 0.099 0.224 0.246 
  (0.026)*** (0.031)*** (0.036)*** (0.055)*** 
endowments Ln(Entry grades) 0.016 0.035 0.006 0.012 
  (0.005)*** (0.017)** (0.013) (0.016) 
 Ln(Student-staff ratio) 0.000 -0.000 0.006 0.005 
  (0.001) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) 
 Ln(library spend) 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
 Ln(facilities spend) -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Ln(research score) 0.068 0.038 -0.035 -0.026 
  (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.024) (0.029) 
 time   -0.000 0.0234 
    (0.004) (0.0298) 
 interact    -0.0236 
     (0.0321) 
coefficients Ln(Entry grades) 0.891 0.887 1.501 1.532 
  (0.358)** (0.369)** (0.330)*** (0.358)*** 
 Ln(Student-staff ratio) 0.196 -0.085 -0.090 -0.054 
  (0.123) (0.182) (0.151) (0.146) 
 Ln(library spend) 0.435 -0.115 0.024 0.027 
  (0.205)** (0.173) (0.199) (0.190) 
 Ln(facilities spend) 0.126 0.151 0.194 0.154 
  (0.107) (0.125) (0.128) (0.129) 
 Ln(research score) 0.376 0.090 0.344 0.434 
  (0.156)** (0.058) (0.098)*** (0.154)*** 
 Constant -2.183 -0.871 -1.980 -2.105 
  (0.322)*** (0.414)** (0.425)*** (0.484)*** 
 time   -0.003 0.0214 
    (0.003) (0.0289) 
 interact    -0.0271 




TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
THREE WAY BLINDER-OAXACA DECOMPOSITION OF THE RESULTS. 
  (1) 
Group 1 = after 
2008 
(2) 
Group 1 = Pre-
92 
(3) 
Group 1 = Pre-
92 
(4) 
Group 1 = Pre-
92 
interaction Ln(Entry grades) 0.016 0.064 0.108 0.110 
  (0.007)** (0.027)** (0.024)*** (0.026)*** 
 Ln(Student-staff ratio) -0.000 0.007 0.008 0.005 
  (0.001) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
 Ln(library spend) 0.018 -0.005 0.001 0.001 
  (0.008)** (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
 Ln(facilities spend) 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.008 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 Ln(research score) 0.065 0.025 0.096 0.121 
  (0.027)** (0.016) (0.028)*** (0.043)*** 
 time   0.001 -0.0217 
    (0.004) (0.0301) 
 interact    0.0225 
     (0.0298) 
N  968 968 968 968 
N_1  450 509 509 509 
N_2  518 459 459 459 
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column of the table divides the sample into two 
groups. In column (1), Group 1 is from 2009 to 2012 and Group 2 is from 2005 to 2008. In columns (2) to (4), 
Group 1 is for pre-92 universities while Group 2 is for post-92 universities. The first panel shows the overall 
difference in the outcome variable (log percentage good degree) and decomposes it into endowment, coefficient 
and interaction effects. The rest of the table shows the detailed decomposition by variable. Time and interact are 
the subsumed effects of all time dummies and the interactions between time dummies and entry grades, where 







INTERACTING YEAR WITH MEASURES OF UNIVERSITY QUALITY 
 
Dep var: ln(% good degree) (1) (2) 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Ln(Entry grades) 0.108 (0.037)*** 0.156 (0.030)*** 
Ln(Student-staff ratio) -0.044 (0.024)* -0.028 (0.027) 
Ln(library spend) 0.028 (0.015)* 0.025 (0.016) 
Ln(facilities spend) -0.003 (0.012) 0.005 (0.011) 
Ln(research score) -0.006 (0.022) 0.021 (0.008)*** 
2005 0.008 (0.006) -0.006 (0.007) 
2006 -0.000 (0.006) -0.017 (0.009)* 
2007 0.000 (0.009) -0.025 (0.011)** 
2008 0.003 (0.009) -0.021 (0.011)* 
2009 0.011 (0.010) -0.015 (0.012) 
2010 0.019 (0.011)* -0.007 (0.013) 
2011 0.032 (0.012)*** 0.010 (0.013) 
2012 0.048 (0.012)*** 0.035 (0.013)*** 
Post-92 university -0.154 (0.039)***   
Post-92 * 2005 -0.025 (0.012)**   
Post-92 * 2006 -0.031 (0.015)**   
Post-92 * 2007 -0.041 (0.017)**   
Post-92 * 2008 -0.037 (0.019)**   
Post-92 * 2009 -0.005 (0.036)   
Post-92 * 2010 -0.001 (0.038)   
Post-92 * 2011 0.009 (0.039)   
Post-92 * 2012 0.029 (0.041)   
Russell Group   0.122 (0.016)*** 
Russell Group * 2005   0.009 (0.009) 
Russell Group * 2006   0.013 (0.012) 
Russell Group * 2007   0.018 (0.021) 
Russell Group * 2008   0.005 (0.015) 
Russell Group * 2009   0.008 (0.015) 
Russell Group * 2010   0.003 (0.015) 
Russell Group * 2011   0.011 (0.017) 
Russell Group * 2012   0.001 (0.018) 
N 968 968 
Universities 116 116 
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢  0.0847 (0.0072)*** 0.0858 (0.0072)*** 
𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈 0.0191 (0.0055)*** 0.0208 (0.0055)*** 
𝜆𝜆 4.437 (0.0118)*** 4.126 (0.0116)*** 
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Estimation 
method is Greene’s (2005) True Random Effects model with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in 





PERCENTAGE OF FIRST CLASS DEGREES AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Dep var: ln(% first class degree) (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(Entry grades) 0.362 0.314 0.264 
 (0.112)*** (0.099)*** (0.125)** 
Ln(Student-staff ratio)  -0.054 -0.047 
  (0.076) (0.074) 
Ln(library spend)  0.085 0.079 
  (0.038)** (0.040)** 
Ln(facilities spend)  -0.001 -0.005 
  (0.028) (0.027) 
Ln(research score)  0.087 0.116 
  (0.023)*** (0.042)*** 
2005 0.020 0.020 -0.130 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.352) 
2006 0.057 0.051 0.096 
 (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.414) 
2007 0.065 0.044 0.153 
 (0.020)*** (0.022)** (0.455) 
2008 0.118 0.101 0.433 
 (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.448) 
2009 0.143 0.070 -1.086 
 (0.027)*** (0.028)** (0.653)* 
2010 0.180 0.103 -0.615 
 (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.670) 
2011 0.258 0.185 -0.285 
 (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.657) 
2012 0.389 0.309 0.714 
 (0.028)*** (0.032)*** (0.664) 
Entry grades*2005   0.027 
   (0.062) 
Entry grades*2006   -0.008 
   (0.073) 
Entry grades*2007   -0.018 
   (0.081) 
Entry grades*2008   -0.057 
   (0.078) 
Entry grades*2009   0.201 
   (0.113)* 
Entry grades*2010   0.124 
   (0.115) 
Entry grades*2011   0.081 
   (0.113) 
Entry grades*2012   -0.072 
   (0.114) 
N 968 968 968 
Universities 116 116 116 
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢  0.1989 0.1880 0.1917 
 (0.0342)*** (0.0293)*** (0.0277)*** 
𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈  0.0649 0.0696 0.0639 
 (0.0202)*** (0.0143)*** (0.0146)*** 
𝜆𝜆  3.066 2.7003 3.001 
 (0.0530)*** (0.0424)*** (0.0410)*** 
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Estimation 
method is Greene’s (2005) True Random Effects model with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in 




FIGURE 1. Box plot of percentage of good degrees (first class and upper second class 













































































































































































































































































RANDOM EFFECTS RESULTS FOR THE SAME SPECIFICATIONS AS TABLE 2. 
 
Dep var: ln(% good degree) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Entry grades) 0.404 0.316 0.217 0.309 
 (0.043)*** (0.042)*** (0.069)*** (0.042)*** 
Ln(Student-staff ratio)  -0.073 -0.077 -0.065 
  (0.032)** (0.033)** (0.029)** 
Ln(library spend)  0.050 0.042 0.026 
  (0.016)*** (0.018)** (0.014)* 
Ln(facilities spend)  -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(research score)  0.029 0.061 0.035 
  (0.009)*** (0.019)*** (0.007)*** 
2005 0.008 0.009 -0.102  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.166)  
2006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.187  
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.258)  
2007 -0.021 -0.031 -0.350  
 (0.011)** (0.011)*** (0.269)  
2008 -0.022 -0.029 -0.317  
 (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.268)  
2009 -0.003 -0.031 -0.895  
 (0.012) (0.013)** (0.357)**  
2010 -0.001 -0.028 -1.012  
 (0.013) (0.013)** (0.379)***  
2011 0.016 -0.008 -0.948  
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.362)***  
2012 0.033 0.009 -0.643  
 (0.013)*** (0.013) (0.370)*  
Entry grades*2005   0.020  
   (0.029)  
Entry grades*2006   0.033  
   (0.045)  
Entry grades*2007   0.058  
   (0.047)  
Entry grades*2008   0.053  
   (0.047)  
Entry grades*2009   0.151  
   (0.062)**  
Entry grades*2010   0.172  
   (0.066)***  
Entry grades*2011   0.165  
   (0.063)***  
Entry grades*2012   0.114  
   (0.065)*  
N 968 968 968 968 
Universities 116 116 116 116 
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Estimation 
method is random effects with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
